A week later, the invasion seemed over. The Facebook group set up by the jihadists, called Knights of al-Nusra Invasion (Fursan Ghazawat Alnusra), was banned. A former "radical" alerted Fox News to the group, who pressured the company to close it down. This fledgling attempt to harness social networking tells us quite a lot about the jihadists themselves, but also about the usefulness of such websites for political movements of any cause.
At first glance, Facebook promised much to the jihadists. While it remains a mystery who closed their forums, members reasoned that intelligence agencies could hardly close Facebook. If members or groups were banned, jihadists could just set up more membership accounts. It seemed a secure platform for persuading others of the jihadist cause. One member of al-Faloja suggested the jihadist Facebook invasion was "not to introduce jihadi forum members to Facebook, but to introduce Facebook users to jihadi forums". Another added, "we will be able to reach the American public opinion and make it see the facts its administration is trying so hard to hide".
The idea took hold. Members elected an amir (holy commander) to lead and organise the invasion (apologies if this seems Python-esque). In a rare departure for jihadist forums, however, there was dissent and deliberation too. The closure of the sites they had used for many years had brought open frustration to longstanding forum members as they were forced to find new spaces. Where once forums were echo chambers in which the views of authority figures were unanimously affirmed, now questions could be asked about the strategy and operations required to spread the word.
Spirits were high as they noticed the Washington Post was covering their efforts. "If our ideas alone terrorise them," said one member, "what will our implementation of ideas do? Rush O brothers to make this real." As with the attacks on the Twin Towers in 2001, were the jihadists again using the west's technology against it? YouTube, Megavideo and other platforms could all be invaded. There were reasons not to dismiss this as bluster. The Obama campaign had shown how a Facebook campaign could overcome the difficulty of turning passive supporters into active ones. Such social networks have low barriers to entry. By framing members of Obama Facebook groups as "stakeholders", it became easier to convince them to donate money. In theory, jihadists could use Facebook to tap into latent, passive supporters around the world: people who might contribute their money and, just as importantly, their address books. The geographic dispersion of jihadists around the world would be irrelevant. Social networks count.
However, the Obama campaign's striking success lay in the way Facebook and the campaign seemed to emerge and grow together. To create a buzz, a sense of being part of a new phenomenon testing uncharted waters, a political movement can't just use existing, familiar media. It is unclear whether joining a Facebook jihadist group offers sufficient novelty to potential supporters around the world.
The Obama campaign was also notable for the sheer volume of video clips produced, forwarded and mashed up by supporters. With such scale, it is no surprise that a few became viral hits. Achieving viral-like diffusion is an inexact science, to the despair, no doubt, of advertising and PR firms. What people will find funny or moving is hard to anticipate in advance. But numbers also seem to matter, and here the jihadists seem a small, tight-knit community rather than an expanding circle of potential contributors.
Following the banning of the Invasion Facebook group, a leading member posted messages on al-Jazeera Talk calling on supporters to participate in two subsequent "secret groups" set up on Facebook, one in Arabic and one in English. To avoid the scrutiny of Facebook authorities, one member of al-Faloja suggested that rather than creating groups that can be "removed with a single click", the jihadists should create memberships in already active and popular groups on Facebook. Through these groups jihadists could gradually spread their material. "We can post the same news that appears on al-Faloja."
Following months of shutdowns, there must be a limit to how much jihadists will continue to seek out new site after new site. Indeed, denying jihadist groups any of their forums can multiply grievance upon grievance and prompt a backlash. There are signs this is already happening. Following the closure of al-Faloja on 20 December, former members expressed their fury on forums such as Al-Jazeera Talk and some remaining jihadist forums. An article on one of the remaining sites received many supporting comments. It directly addressed "the Crusaders and their agents", saying, "With the closure of all our sites, you have left us with no choice but to physically join the caravan of jihad. With no jihadist sites through which we can support our brother mujahideen, there is no point for us to stay behind. We shall join them. Your act has shamed us and caused us to think 'what is left for us?'"
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jan/12/facebook-jihadis
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